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Abstract 
 
This paper suggests an improvement to the BB84 
scheme in Quantum key distribution. The original 
scheme has its weakness in letting quantifiably more 
information gain to an eavesdropper during public 
announcement of unencrypted bases lists. The security 
of the secret key comes at the expense of the final key 
length. We aim at exploiting the randomness of 
preparation (measurement) basis and the bit values 
encoded (observed), so as to randomize the bases lists 
before they are communicated over the public 
channel. A proof of security is given for our scheme 
and proven that our protocol results in lesser 
information gain by Eve in comparison with BB84 and 
its other extensions. Moreover, an analysis is made on 
the feasibility of our proposal as such and to support 
entanglement based QKD.  The performance of our 
protocol is compared in terms of the upper and lower 
bounds on the tolerable bit error rate. We also 
quantify the information gain (by Eve) mathematically 
using the familiar approach of the concept of 
Shannon’s entropy. The paper models the attack by 
Eve in terms of interference in a multi-access quantum 
channel. Besides, this paper also hints at the 
invalidation of a separate privacy amplification step in 
the "prepare-and-measure" protocols in general.  
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l. Introduction 
 
The framework for quantum cryptography 
essentially lies in the hands of nature [6]. Unless the 
laws of nature break, the security of the QKD schemes 
is assured. The most important axioms of quantum 
mechanics [12, 13, 18] that facilitate this idea are the 
uncertainty principle, quantum entanglement, 
teleportation and quantum measurement theory (which 
is essentially Information gain vs. State 
disturbance).There are no physical means for 
gathering information about the identity of a quantum 
system's state when it is known to be prepared in one 
of a set of non orthogonal states. This is because of the 
indistinguishability inherent among such states. This 
unique feature of quantum phenomena rests on the 
Hilbert space structure [16] along with the fact that 
time evolutions for isolated systems are unitary[14, 17, 
18]. The uncertainty principle [12, 13, 18] explains the 
simultaneous measurability of observables (which are 
mathematicized as operators in Heisenberg 
mechanics).  If two operators commute, they can be 
measured simultaneously, but non-commuting 
operators cannot be measured simultaneously. Thus, 
observables along orthogonal bases cannot be 
observed at the same time. Conscious observation of 
one will completely randomize the result in the other. 
Observation (practically measurement) of a quantum 
state has its effect in producing a tension between 
information gain and disturbance. In this paper, we 
shall quantitatively study the nature of this tension 
with respect to our protocol (which we refer to as 
randomization protocol henceforth). Of course, a 
theoretical description of our protocol is a 
mathematical idealization. Any real-life quantum 
cryptographic system is a complex physical system 
with many degrees of freedom, and is at best an 
approximation to the ideal protocol. Proving the 
security of any particular setup is a difficult task, 
requiring a detailed model of the apparatus. Even a 
seemingly minor and subtle omission can be fatal to 
the security of a cryptographic system. 
In designing a quantum crypt protocol, it is essential to 
prove its security under theoretical and practical 
considerations. Therefore, if one wants to model and 
analyze the cryptographic security of quantum 
protocols, one of the most basic questions to be 
answered is the following.  What does it mean for two 
quantum states to be “close” to each other or “far” 
apart?  That is, we should be concerned with 
defining and relating various notions of “distance” 
between two quantum states. Formally a quantum state 
is nothing more than a square matrix of complex 
numbers that satisfies a certain set of supplementary 
properties. Because of this, any of the notions of 
distance between matrices that can be found in the 
mathematical literature would do for a quick fix. The 
only physical means available with which to 
distinguish two quantum states is that specified by the 
general notion of a quantum-mechanical measurement. 
We include, in this paper an analysis of our protocol 
by considering different distinguishability measures. 
All existing QKD schemes are variations to the 
fundamental BB84 protocol [2, 8]. In the BB84 
protocol, Alice sends a qubit (i.e., a quantum bit or a 
two-level quantum system) in one of four states to 
Bob. The states 0 and + = ( 0  and 1 )/ 2  and 
represent the classical bit 0, while the states and 1  
and − =( 0 - + )/ 2  represent the bit 1. Alice 
chooses one of these four states uniformly at random, 
and sends it to Bob, who chooses randomly to measure 
in either the |0>, |1> basis (the “Z” basis) or the 
+ , − basis (the “X” basis). Then, Alice and Bob 
announce the basis each of them used for each state 
(but not the actual state sent or measured in that basis), 
and discard any bits for which they used different 
bases. The remaining bits form the raw key, which 
will be processed some more to produce the final key.  
In the scheme as proposed by Hannes R Bohm et al 
[2], in addition to the lists of BB84, Alice and Bob 
both possess a preshared secret (randomizer) that is 
split into two parts, S-Alice and S-Bob. The 
information which basis was used during each 
individual measurement is encrypted before it is sent 
over the classical channel using the shared key.  This 
is done by applying logic XOR between the list of 
bases and a part of the shared secret.  This encryption 
of the encoding and measurement bases renders it 
impossible for a third party to correctly sift 
measurement results obtained from eavesdropping on 
the quantum channel.  For the protocol to be secure it 
is mandatory that Alice and Bob use different parts of 
the shared secret and that for successive runs of the 
protocol, the secrecy of the shared secret has to be 
continuously refreshed.  Our proposal has its roots in 
this scheme with the added benefit of invalidating 
explicit privacy amplification step and the randomizer 
need not be refreshed for every run of the protocol. 
The QKD scheme without public announcement of 
basis has been proposed by Won Young Hwang et al 
[1].  In this protocol, Alice and Bob share by any 
method (BB84 scheme) some secure binary random 
sequence that is known to nobody.  This random 
sequence is to be used to determine the encoding basis 
u and u'.  Alice (Bob) encodes (performs spin-
measurement) on the basis z and x when it is 0 and 1, 
respectively.  For example, when the bases random 
sequence is 0, 1, 1, 0, 1.....and the signal random 
sequence that Alice wants to send to Bob is1, 0, 1, 0, 
1..... Then she sends to him the following quantum 
carriers −z , +x , −x , +z , −x ,..... Since 
Alice and Bob have common random sequence, there 
will be perfect correlation between them unless the 
quantum carriers were perturbed by Eve or noise.  Eve 
is naturally prevented from knowing about the 
encoding bases, since she does not know the bases 
sequence.  As we see, public announcement of bases is 
not needed in the proposed scheme.  However, the 
scheme can only be useful if it is possible to use safely 
the bases random sequence repeatedly.  If this is not 
the case, Alice and Bob have to consume the same 
length of random sequences to obtain some length of 
new random sequences.  Fortunately, quantum 
mechanical laws enable the bases random sequences to 
be used repeatedly enough. 
In the Inamori's Protocol [5] Alice and Bob are 
assumed to share initially a random string and the goal 
of QKD is to extend this string.  Alice and Bob also 
choose a classical error-correcting code C1.  Alice 
sends Bob a sequence of single photons as in either 
BB84 or the six-state scheme.  They throw away all 
polarization data that are prepared in different bases 
and keep only the ones that are prepared in the same 
bases.  They randomly select m of those pairs and 
perform a refined data analysis to find out the error 
rate of the various bases.  Alice measures the 
remaining N-m =s particles to generate a random 
string.  Being a random string, it generally has 
nontrivial error syndrome when regarded as a 
corrupted state of the codeword of C1.  Alice transmits 
that error syndrome in an encrypted form to Bob.  This 
is done by using a one-time pad encryption with (part 
of) the common string they initially share as the key.  
Bob corrects his error to recover the string.  They 
discard all the bits where they disagree and keep only 
the ones where they agree.  Finally, Alice and Bob 
perform privacy amplification on the remaining string 
to generate a secure string. 
One important class of protocols is the 
Entanglement Purification Protocol schemes for QKD 
[5, 8].  This is a generalized scheme and can be 
reduced to the standard BB84 and its extensions.  
Suppose Alice and Bob are connected by a noisy 
quantum channel (and perhaps also a noiseless 
classical channel).  Entanglement purification provides 
a way of using the noisy quantum channel to simulate 
a noiseless one.  More concretely, suppose Alice 
creates N EPR pairs and sends half of each pair to 
Bob.   If the quantum communication channel between 
Alice and Bob is noisy (but stationary and memory-
less), then Alice and Bob will share imperfect EPR 
pairs, each in the state P.  They may attempt to apply 
local operations (including preparation of ancillary 
qubits, local unitary transformations, and 
measurements) and classical communications 
(LOCCs) to purify the N imperfect EPR pairs into a 
smaller number n, EPR pairs of high fidelity.  This 
process is called an EPP.  One way to classify EPPs is 
in terms of what type of classical communications 
they require: 'EPPs that can be implemented with only 
one-way classical communications from Alice to Bob, 
known as 1-EPPs' and 'EPPs requiring two-way 
classical communications, known as 2-EPPs'. 
Typically, a 1-EPP will consist of Alice measuring 
a series of commuting operators and sending the 
measurement result to Bob.  Bob will then measure the 
same operators on his qubits.  If there is no noise in 
the channel, Bob will get the same results as Alice, but 
of course when noise is present, some of the results 
will differ.  From the algebraic structure of the list of 
operators measured, Bob can deduce the location and 
nature of the errors and correct them.  Unfortunately, 
the process of measuring EPR pairs will have 
destroyed some of them, so the resulting state consists 
of fewer EPR pairs than Alice sent.   
2-EPPs can be potentially more complex, but 
frequently have a similar structure.  Again, Alice and 
Bob measure a set of identical operators.  Then they 
compare their results, discard some EPR pairs, and 
together select a new set of operators to measure.  An 
essential feature of a 2-EPP is that the subsequent 
choice of measurement operators may depend on the 
outcomes of previous measurements.  This process 
continues for a while until the remaining EPR pairs 
have a low enough error rate for a 1-EPP to succeed.  
Then, a 1-EPP is applied. 
The proof of security of this class has been worked 
out already and its result is used for proving that our 
protocol is secure.  
In section II of our paper, the preliminary 
mathematical results and the basic notations used in 
the analysis of security considerations and information 
gain with respect to our protocol are discussed.  In 
section III, we present a theoretical description of our 
protocol.  In section IV, we analyze its security 
extensively and model all types of attacks by an 
eavesdropper.  We quantify the information gain in the 
subsequent section. The final section includes a 
theoretical consideration of incorporating 
randomization into entanglement based QKD. 
 
2. Mathematical Notations and Definitions 
    This part enables the reader to understand the 
mathematical concepts and their notations used in 
quantum information processing [15, 19].  Much of 
the math given here will enable the reader to visualize 
the mathematical underpinnings given in our paper in 
support of our protocol. 
 
2.1. Operators in Quantum Theory with 
respect to Quantum Cryptography 
 
Density operators are used for various purposes in 
quantum theory, and their significance depends 
somewhat on how they are used.  Usually they 
function as pre-probabilities, i.e., they are devices for 
calculating quantum probabilities.  Think of a density 
operator as something like a probability distribution in 
classical physics.   The most common uses of a density 
operator are: to provide partial information about a 
system, in analogy with a probability distribution in 
classical physics (the operator ze
kTH //− in statistical 
mechanics is an example), and to describe a subsystem 
of a total system made up of two (or more) parts.  
A density ρ matrix is a NN × matrix with unit 
trace that is Hermitian ( )†.,. ρρ =ei  and positive 
semi-definite 0.,. ≥Ψ ψρei  for all Η∈Ψ  
 
2.1.1. Quantum Ensembles. Suppose Alice is 
instructed to generate the quantum state jΨ with 
probability Pj, and ship it to Bob in a closed box which 
is carefully isolated from the environment and keeps 
the quantum system isolated, so the dynamics is 
trivial. 
One speaks of a quantum ensemble {Pj, jΨ } . 
Here the jΨ  are assumed to be normalized, but they 
don't have to be orthogonal to each other.  E.g., Alice 
sometimes prepares a qubit in state o , sometimes in 
state + , etc.  The idea of an ensemble can be used 
even if one is only talking about one event, since it is 
just a method of visualizing probabilities.  The 
unopened box is in front of Bob, who wonders 
whether this system "is in the state s ," by which he 
means either in s  or some state orthogonal to s ; 
the corresponding sample space is{ }][],[ SIS − , 
where [ ] ssS = .  Bob reasons as follows.  If Alice 
prepared jΨ , then the desired probability is given by 
the Born rule, and is [ ] jj sjs ΨΨ=Ρ )|( . 
But he doesn't know which state Alice prepared; all 
he knows is that the probability of her preparing jΨ  
is Pj.  Therefore he assigns to the system in front of 
him a probability  
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is the density operator associated with the ensemble 
{Pj, jΨ } , and Tr means the trace.  The role of 
density operators, as in this example, is to serve as 
convenient tools for calculating probabilities.  A 
density operator provides partial information about a 
system in circumstances where more information is 
potentially available, the same as with a probability. 
In particular, in the case of a state prepared by 
Alice, more information than provided by ρ is at least 
potentially available.  Bob could ask Alice, who 
knows which state jΨ  she prepared.  Or he could go 
ahead and measure the system in front of him to see if 
it is or is not in the state s .  Unless it is a pure state 
the same density operator can be derived from many 
different ensembles {Pj, jΨ }.  In addition to 
ensembles of kets, or pure states, it is sometimes 
convenient to use ensembles of mixed states, {Pj, ρj}, 
with a density operator for the ensemble given by 
j
j
jρρ ∑Ρ= with, again, nonnegative probabilities 
{Pj} that sum to 1. 
Two different ensembles with the same density 
matrix are indistinguishable as far as an observer is 
concerned; when this is the case, there exists no 
measurement that can allow the observer a decision 
between the ensembles with probability of success 
better than chance.  
Now consider the following preparation of a 
quantum system: A flips a fair coin and, depending 
upon the outcome, sends one of two different pure 
states 0Ψ  or 1Ψ to B. Then the “pureness” of the 
quantum state is “diluted” by the classical uncertainty 
about the resulting coin flip. In this case, no 
deterministic fine-grained measurement generally 
exists for identifying A’s exact preparation, and the 
quantum state is said to be a mixed state. B’s 
knowledge of the system—that is, the source from 
which he draws his predictions about any potential 
measurement outcomes—can now no longer be 
represented by a vector in a Hilbert space. Rather, it 
must be described by the density operator from a 
statistical average of the projectors associated with A’s 
possible fine-grained preparations. 
Now, we describe how to compute the 
probability of a certain measurement result from the 
density matrix. Mathematically speaking, a density 
matrix ρ can be regarded as an object to which we 
can apply another operator xE to obtain a probability. 
In particular, taking the trace of the product of the two 
matrices yields the probability that the measurement 
result is given that the state was ρ , i.e.,  
)(]|[Pr xETrstatexresultob ρρ ===
Here x the serves as a label, connecting the 
operator xE  and the outcome x, but otherwise has no 
specific physical meaning. (This formula may help the 
reader understand the designation “density operator”: 
it is required in order to obtain a probability density 
function for the possible measurement outcomes.) 
 
2.2. Some Important Properties of the 
Operators 
 
1. A density operator (density matrix) is a positive 
operator on the quantum Hilbert space with unit trace. 
2. An operator is positive if it is (i) Hermitian, and (ii) 
none of its (necessarily real) eigen values is less than 
zero (positive semi-definite or nonnegative semi-
definite).More concretely, R is positive if and only 
if ΨΨ R is real and ΨΨ R ≥0 for every Ψ  in 
the Hilbert space.  The trace of an operator Q, written 
Tr(Q) or tr(Q), is ∑=
j
jQjQTr )( using any 
orthonormal basis { }j .  The result is independent of 
which orthonormal basis one uses. 
3. The eigen values{ }jλ of a density operator ρ are 
nonnegative, and since they sum to 1 they must all lie 
between 0 and 1 (like probabilities).  Two cases are 
distinguished: if one of the eigenvalues is 1 and the 
rest are 0, ρ is (or refers to or corresponds to) a pure 
state. In all other cases it is a mixed state. In the case 
of a pure state, one can always write ρ in the 
form Ψ Ψ for some normalized ket Ψ .   
Like any Hermitian operator, ρ can be expanded in 
terms of projectors on its eigenvectors, 
∑=
j
jjj aaλρ  
where the { }ja  form an orthonormal basis. The rank 
of ρ is the number of nonzero eigenvalues (degenerate 
eigenvalues counted more than once).  
 
2.3. Density Operator for a Subsystem 
 
Consider a system consisting of two subsystems A 
and B, with a Hilbert space which is a tensor 
product ba Η⊗Η . Suppose the state of the total system 
at some time, thought of as a pre-probability (e.g., 
obtained by integrating Schrödinger’s equation from a 
state at an earlier time) is Ψ . Then we can use it to 
calculate probabilities in any decomposition of the 
identity that interests us. In particular, we may be 
interested in properties of the system A corresponding 
to a decomposition of its identity 
j
j
j
j
ja aaaI ∑∑ == ][  
We can write the probability as: 
)(])][([][)Pr( ρjajjj aTrIaTraa =ΨΨ⊗=ΨΨ=  
where 
)( ΨΨ= bTrρ  
is called the reduced density operator for subsystem A. 
     In the course of this paper, we describe other 
relevant mathematical results that characterize the 
development of the randomization protocol.  
  
3. Theoretical Description of the 
Randomization Protocol 
 
For our present discussion let us idealize a 
noiseless quantum channel. The randomization 
protocol that we propose exploits the randomness in 
the preparation (measurement) basis and bit values 
sent (observed).  We base our protocol in the fact that 
randomizing the basis-list (which contains classical bit 
values representing the choice of basis) before being 
publicly announced will consequently reduce 
information gain by an eavesdropper on the final sifted 
key. We understand that the scheme, as suggested by 
Hannes R. Bohm [2], randomizes the basis-list. 
However, the shared secret S used to XOR with the 
original basis-list remains the same.  In subsequent 
runs of the protocol, Eve can obtain fairly better 
information as to bit values in the shared secret.  Note 
that knowledge on the shared secret S that has been 
used during basis reconciliation is equivalent to 
knowledge on sifting function f that was used to create 
the sifted key. 
We can extend the same scheme to hide the shared 
secret S through quantum data hiding [9].  This 
implies that S can be dynamically generated by one of 
the parties and communicated to the other for each run 
of the protocol.  The quantum data hiding scheme is 
secure if Alice and Bob cannot communicate quantum 
states and do not share prior quantum entanglement.  
This is exactly the situation we are in.  We need to 
communicate beforehand the secrets bit string S.  It 
has been found that even states without quantum 
entanglement can exhibit properties of nonlocality. 
We now present the phases involved in our 
randomization protocol. 
1. (Quantum transmission). The BB84 quantum 
transmission is executed.  Alice encodes random bit 
values in random basis and sends the qubits to Bob via 
the quantum channel.  Bob measures the qubits under 
a random choice of measurement basis.  Since, we 
have assumed a noiseless channel, the quantum states 
prepared by Alice remain undisturbed.  Thus Bob will 
observe the same bit values as encoded for the same 
choice of basis.  In the most trivial case, the bit string 
encoded and observed is assumed to be the same.  This 
is true for bit values that have been prepared and 
measured in same basis (since the channel is 
noiseless). For different choice of basis the probability 
that the measured value being same as the encoded 
value is 1/2.  
2. (XOR operation). For the trivial case, the basis 
list of Alice A is XORed with the random bit string K 
(which she encodes) to produce a new list Na.  The 
same operation is performed by Bob at the other end 
(his bases list B XORed with the observed bit string K 
to produce Nb).     
3. (Announcement of randomized bases lists). 
Alice and Bob publicly announce their respective 
randomized lists Na and Nb  
4. (Retrieval of bases). Alice performs an XOR 
between Nb and K to obtain the bases list of Bob.  At 
the other side of the link, Bob performs XOR between 
Na and K to obtain Alice's basis list.  Thus, the choice 
of bases of each party has been announced secretly to 
the other. 
5. A common sifted key is generated by discarding 
the bit values for which the choice of bases was not 
same. 
 
Figure 1. (a) Quantum Channel Transmission and after error correction (b) A comprehensive pictorial 
flow of our Randomization protocol 
 
There is considerable change in our protocol for 
the more practical considerations.  This involves 
taking into account multi-access interference, signal 
attenuation and random noise (eavesdropping).  Under 
this condition, after the initial step of quantum 
transmission, error estimation and error correction are 
performed over the raw key (rather on the sifted key as 
in the original BB84). 
Let’s suppose that the raw key is of length p.  Alice 
announces a subset of positions of size k and the bit 
values for those positions in the raw key.  Bob also 
returns the bits he received in those positions.  Both 
compute the observed error-rate e and accept the 
quantum transmission if e <= emax as set initially by 
Alice.  They remove the k bits announced from the 
raw key.  If e > emax then they abort the current run of 
the protocol.  Error correction subsequently follows.  
Alice selects L random subsets X1...XL of positions 
and announces Xi (i=1 to L) together with the parity of 
all bits in Xi.  Bob compares the parity bits announced 
by Alice to the one he gets with his bits and tells Alice 
whether they are all the same.  If some parity does not 
match, then Alice and Bob abort.  Finally, we have an 
error free raw key as in Figure 1. (a). Both parties now 
have the same key string K.  Now the protocol may 
terminate here.  But, in order to incorporate implicit 
privacy amplification steps 3, 4, 5 are carried out as in 
Figure 1. (b). This protocol, as we see, invalidates the 
necessity for explicit privacy amplification procedure.   
 
3.1. Feasibility of the Randomization Protocol  
      
    The feasibility of the randomization protocol lies in 
effective quantum error correction. Our protocol 
requires QEC to be performed over the entire raw key. 
The error correction scheme has to be exact in order to 
produce the key and randomize the bases lists on 
either side of the channel.  
     It is an immediate result of the no-cloning theorem 
that no quantum error-correcting code of length n can 
fix n/2 erasures because that would imply that we 
could reconstruct two copies of an encoded quantum 
state from two halves of the full codeword. This 
statement is valid regardless of the dimension of the 
coding Hilbert space. Another well known result from 
the theory of quantum error correction is that a length 
n code can fix t arbitrary single position errors if and 
only if it can fix 2t erasure errors. This follows 
immediately from the quantum error-correction 
conditions  
ijabjbai C δ=ΨΕΕΨ || †  
(for basis encoded states { }iΨ and correctable errors  
{ }aE ) and implies that no QECC of length n can fix 
more than n=4 arbitrary errors, regardless of the 
dimension of the coding and encoded Hilbert spaces. 
Now, this turns out to be a genuine restriction of our 
scheme. QEC in the BB84 scheme is applied only on 
bit values measured in the same bases. This implies 
that the QEC applies on key whose length is lesser in 
comparison with our scheme and thereby, more robust.  
In the worst case, the bit values encoded and observed 
differ in all bit positions. This renders our scheme 
unusable with Alice and Bob immediately aborting the 
protocol operation. The best case where there are no 
bit flip errors irrespective of the bases, matches the 
trivial case we had discussed earlier. In the average 
case, we might expect exactly n/2 errors for a raw key 
of length n. For Alice and Bob to continue, QEC has 
to correct n/2 bits exactly. But, there is no such exact 
error-correction scheme that will do this unless we 
retort to an approximate QEC whose fidelity is 
exponentially closer to 1 [21].  
 
4. Modeling of Attacks and Proof of 
Security 
 
In this section, we present detailed security 
considerations of our protocol.  We model all types of 
attacks or eavesdropping strategies by Eve and 
subsequently prove that our protocol remains secure. 
Our protocol is essentially BB84 with the public 
announcement of the bases encrypted.  
Our protocol improvises upon the one suggested by 
Hannes R.Bohm [2] in that the shared secret S in the 
original scheme is taken to be the shared error-
corrected key string.  For each run of our protocol, the 
key string is new and its secrecy completely refreshed 
owing to the randomness of key string encoded 
(observed). 
 
4.1. Security Requirements of the Protocol  
  
Naively, one might consider a security requirement 
of the form ( )nIeve δ< , where eveI  represents 
eavesdropper’s mutual information with the final key 
and n is is the length of the final key.  However, such a 
definition of security is too weak, since it allows Eve 
to learn a few bits of a long message.  For instance, the 
eavesdropper may know something about the structure 
of the message that Alice is going to send to Bob.  
Another naive definition of security would be to 
require that kneve eI
−< for any eavesdropping strategy.  
Unfortunately, such a definition of security is too 
strong to be achievable.  For instance, Eve can simply 
replace the signal prepared by Alice by sending Bob 
some signals with specific polarizations prepared by 
her.  Such an eavesdropping attack is highly unlikely 
to pass the verification test (by producing a small error 
rate).  However, in the unlikely event that it does pass 
the verification test, Eve will have perfect information 
on the key shared between Alice and Bob, thus 
violating the security requirement kneve eI
−< . For this 
paper, however, we simply use the following 
definition: 
A QKD protocol to generate key bits is correct if, 
for any strategy used by Eve, either Alice or Bob will 
abort with high probability or, with high probability, 
Alice and Bob will agree on a final key which is 
chosen nearly uniformly at random.  The protocol is 
secure if, for any strategy used by Eve, either Alice or 
Bob will abort with high probability or Eve’s 
information about the key will be at most se− for some 
security parameter s.  In all cases, “with high 
probability” means with probability at least re−−1 for 
some security parameter r.  The resources required for 
the implementation of a QKD scheme must be at most 
polynomial in r and s.  For simplicity, in what follows, 
we will consider the case where r = s = n (key length) 
and call it simply the security parameter. 
 
4.2. Types of Attacks and Eavesdropping 
Strategies 
 
All of the protocol operations we consider will take 
place over a noisy quantum channel, even when there 
is no eavesdropper present.  We shall be primarily 
interested in a special class of quantum channels 
known as Pauli channels [5, 8].  From the perspective 
of Alice and Bob, noise in the channel could have 
been caused by an eavesdropper Eve.  We will need to 
consider two types of eavesdropping strategy by Eve.  
The first strategy, the joint attack, is the most general 
attack allowed by quantum mechanics.  In a joint 
attack by Eve, Eve has a quantum computer.  She 
takes all quantum signals sent by Alice and performs 
an arbitrary unitary transformation involving those 
signals, adding any additional ancilla qubits she cares 
to use.  She keeps any part of the system she desires 
and transmits the remainder to Bob.  She listens to the 
public discussion (for error correction/detection and 
privacy amplification) between Alice and Bob before 
finally deciding on the measurement operator on her 
part of the system.  The joint attack allows Eve to 
perform any quantum operation on the qubits 
transmitted by Alice.  For the security proof, we shall 
also consider a Pauli attack.  A Pauli attack by Eve is a 
joint attack where the final operation performed on the 
transmitted qubits is a general Pauli channel. 
Our protocol remains secure under a probabilistic 
clone/resend attack strategy [11].  This attack has the 
following description: Eve employs such a cloning 
machine.  She may clone every polarization quantum 
states sent by Alice and then resend Bob a new one 
corresponding to her own result.  The input state sent 
by Alice is one of the four quantum states so that the 
sets of input states can be easily enumerated.  The 
probability of each set occurs can be figured out in 
terms of the corresponding probability of quantum 
state sent by Alice.  The input states sets can be 
categorized into three divisions according to the type 
of 'overlapping' of two input states.  If two input states 
are orthogonal, the maximum cloning efficiency 
approaches to 1, 
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When two input states are non-orthogonal, the 
maximum cloning efficiencies can be calculated as 
following: 
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Incase of two input states are the same, the 
maximum cloning efficiency becomes 0.5 
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Given the probability each input states set occurs 
and corresponding maximum cloning efficiencies, the 
average of cloning efficiency can be calculated as 
following: 
6679.05.0
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145858.0
8
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It means that Eve can clone 66.79% quantum states 
sent by Alice when she use the probabilistic cloning 
machine to eavesdrop.  So Eve is able to resend Bob a 
correct qubit in 66.79% cases, while Alice and Bob 
would not notice her intervention.  However, in the 
rest 33.21% cases, Eve can't clone states correctly; 
Alice and Bob may discover her intervention in about 
half of these cases (l6.6%), due to getting uncorrelated 
results.  Consequently, the information that Eve could 
get in probabilistic clone/resend attacks fashion is 
83.4% and the QBER of the sifted key for Alice and 
Bob is 16.6%. 
 
4.3. Proof of Security 
 
 Our scheme belongs to the class of 'Prepare-
and-Measure' protocols [5].  We here prove that this 
class of protocols are secure.  We have already 
presented an account of the EPP (1-way and 2-way) 
schemes [5].  In the EPP scheme, Alice creates N EPR 
pairs and sends half of each to Bob.  Alice and Bob 
then test the error rates in the X and Z bases on a 
randomly chosen subset of m pairs.  If the error rate is 
too high, they abort; otherwise, they perform an EPP 
on the remaining N-m pairs.  Finally, they measure (in 
the Z basis) each of the EPR pairs left after C, 
producing a shared random key about which, they 
hope, Eve has essentially no information.  The security 
of our protocol can be derived from the proof of 
security of EPP schemes.  The reduction to a “prepare-
and-measure” protocol is done as a series of 
modifications to the EPP protocol to produce 
equivalent protocols.  The main insight is that the X-
type measurements do not actually affect the final 
QKD protocol, and therefore are not needed.  The X-
type measurements give the error syndrome for phase 
(Z) errors, which do not affect the value of the final 
key.  Instead, Z errors represent information Eve has 
gained about the key.  The phase information thus 
must be delocalized, but need not actually be 
corrected.  The upshot is that Alice and Bob need not 
actually measure the X-type operators and can 
therefore manage without a quantum computer.  Our 
initial goal is to manipulate the EPP protocol to make 
this clear.  The X-type measurements do not, however, 
disappear completely: instead, they become privacy 
amplification.  For the first step, we modify the EPP to 
put it in a standard form.  Because it is a CSS-like 1-
EPP, and each operator being measured is either X-
type or -Z type.  The operators all commute, and do 
not depend on the outcome of earlier measurements, 
so we can reorder them to put all of the Z-type 
measurements before all of the X-type measurements.  
Now we have an EPP consisting of a series of Z-type 
measurements, followed by a series of X-type 
measurements, followed by CNOTs and Pauli 
operations (which we can represent as I, X, and/or Z 
on each qubit).  Then Alice and Bob measure all 
qubits in the Z basis.  As a second step, we can move 
all X Pauli operations to before the X-type 
measurements, since they commute with each other.  
Moreover, if Alice and Bob are simply going to 
measure a qubit in the Z basis, there is no point in first 
performing a Z phase-shift operation, since it will not 
affect at all the distribution of outcomes of the 
measurement.  We now have an EPP protocol 
consisting of Z-type measurements, followed by X 
Pauli gates, followed by X-type measurements, 
followed by a sequence of CNOT gates which does 
not depend on the measurement outcomes.  
But nothing in the current version of the protocol 
depends on the outcomes of the X-type measurements, 
so those measurements are useless.  We might as well 
drop them.  Furthermore, X Pauli operations and 
CNOT gates are just classical operations, so we might 
as well wait to do them until after the Z basis 
measurement, which converts the qubits into classical 
bits.  What’s more, it is redundant to perform Z-type 
measurements followed by measurement of for each 
qubit.  We can deduce with complete accuracy the 
outcome of each Z-type measurement from the 
outcomes of the measurements on individual qubits.  
For instance, if a sequence of three bits is measured to 
have the value 101, then we know that measurement 
of Z*Z*Z will give the result +1, as the parity of the 
three bits is even.  Thus, we are left with the following 
protocol: Alice prepares a number of EPR pairs, and 
sends half of each to Bob.  She and Bob each perform 
the correction rotation (I or H for the two-basis 
scheme; I, T, TT or for the three-basis scheme), then 
measure each qubit in the Z basis.  They use some of 
the results to test the error rate, and on the rest they 
perform some classical gates derived from the original 
EPP. 
When the EPP is based on a CSS code, the Z-type 
operators correspond to the parity checks of a classical 
error-correcting code C1, and the X-type operators 
correspond to the parity checks of another classical 
code C2┴, with C2┴ subset of C1.  The quantum 
codewords of the CSS code are super positions of all 
classical codewords from the cosets of C2┴ in C1. 
Measuring the Z-type operators, therefore, 
corresponds to determining the error syndrome for C1, 
whereas measuring the X-type operators determines 
the error syndrome for C2.  The usual 1-EPP protocol 
for correcting errors is for Bob to compute the 
difference, in both bases, between Alice’s syndrome 
and his syndrome, and then to perform a Pauli 
operation to give his states the same syndromes as 
Alice’s state.  That is, Alice and Bob now each have a 
superposition over the same coset of C2' within the 
same coset of C1 (or rather, they have an entangled 
state, a superposition over all possible shared cosets 
for a given pair of syndromes).  The decoding 
procedure then determines which coset C2┴ of they 
share and use that as the final decoded state. 
More concretely, we can describe the classical 
procedure as follows: For the error correction stage, 
Alice computes and announces the parity checks for 
the code C1.  Bob subtracts his error syndrome from 
Alice’s and flips bits (according to the optimal error-
correction procedure) to produce a state with relative 
error syndrome; that is, he should now have the same 
string as Alice.  Then Alice and Bob perform privacy 
amplification: they compute the parity checks of C2’ 
(i.e., they multiply by the generator matrix of C2) and 
use those as their final secret key bits. There is one 
final step to convert the protocol to a “prepare-and-
measure” protocol. Instead of preparing N qubits and 
sending them to Bob, Alice prepares 2N+e (for BB84) 
or 3N+e (for the six-state scheme). Instead of waiting 
for Alice to announce which rotation she has 
performed (I, H, T or TT), Bob simply chooses one at 
random. Instead of rotating and then measuring in the 
Z basis, Bob simply measures in the X, Y, or Z basis, 
depending on which rotation he chose. Then Alice and 
Bob announce their bases, and discard those bits for 
which they measured different bases.  With high 
probability, there will be at least N remaining bits. 
Alice and Bob perform the error test on m of them, 
and do error correction and privacy amplification on 
the remaining N-m.  Since the discarded bits are just 
meaningless noise, they do not affect the security of 
the resulting “prepare-and-measure” protocol.  The 
only difference is that security must now be measured 
in terms of the remaining bits rather than the original 
number of qubits sent.  When we begin with a two-
basis scheme, we end up with BB84; when we begin 
with a three-basis scheme, we end up with the six-state 
protocol. 
From the above discussion, we come to the point 
where the proof of security of our randomization 
protocol is implied. 
 
5. Quantifying Information Gain  
 
Suppose Eve obtains a quantum system secretly 
prepared in one of two nonorthogonal pure quantum 
states.  Quantum theory dictates that there is no 
measurement she can use to certify which of the two 
states was actually prepared.  This is well known.  A 
simple, but less recognized, corollary is that no 
interaction used for performing such an information-
gathering measurement can leave both states 
unchanged in the process.  If Eve could completely 
regenerate the unknown quantum state after 
measurement, then-by making further nondisturbing 
information-gathering measurements on it-she would 
eventually be able to infer the state’s identity after all.  
In this section, we present the quantification of 
information gain and disturbance due to Eve's 
intervention in the quantum channel.  All of the above 
attacks have been taken into consideration.  We shall 
also see the quantized nature of Eve's information with 
respect to the attacks on the classical channel.  We 
extensively make of use of the results derived by 
Christopher A. Fuchs [4, 10]. 
 
5.1. The Scenario 
 
Alice randomly prepares a quantum system to be in 
either a state 0ρˆ  or a state 1ρˆ .  These states, in the 
most general setting, are described by density 
operators on an N-dimensional Hilbert space for some 
N; there is no restriction that they be pure states, 
orthogonal, or commuting for that matter.  After the 
preparation, the quantum system is passed into a 
“black box” where it may be probed Eve in any way 
allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics.  That is to 
say, Eve may allow the system to interact with an 
auxiliary system leaving the probe ultimately in one of 
two states 
0
ˆ Eρ  or 1ˆ Eρ so that after the systems have 
decoupled, she may perform quantum mechanical 
measurements on the probe itself.  Because the 
outcome statistics of the measurement will then be 
conditioned upon the quantum state that went into the 
black box, the measurement may provide Eve with 
some information about the quantum state and may 
even provide her a basis on which to make an 
inference as to the state’s identity.  Eve now has the 
potential to gather information about identity of 
Alice’s preparation, via the alternate states of her 
probe. Meanwhile the states 0ρˆ and 1ρˆ no longer 
form valid descriptions of Alice’s system because it 
will have become entangled with Eve’s ancilla.  We 
now have the following list of considerations: 
• a concise account of all probes and interactions that 
Eve may use to obtain evidence about the identity of 
the state. 
• a convenient description of the most general kind of 
quantum measurement she may then perform on her  
probe. 
• a measure of the information or inference power 
provided by any given measurement. 
• a good notion by which to measure the 
distinguishability of mixed quantum states and a 
measure of disturbance   based on it. 
 
5.2. Mathematical Description of the 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
The most general notion of measurement allowed 
within quantum mechanics is the POVM (short for 
Positive Operator-Valued Measure).  This type results 
in classical information. 
Lets assume the following notations: 
1,0,ˆ =ssρ   state of the system prepared by Alice and 
is the density operator on Hilbert space AΗ  
tˆ  unitary interactions 
σˆ some standard density operator on probe's (Eve) 
Hilbert space EH  
Etr represents a partial trace over Eve’s probe. 
Atr represents a partial trace over Alice’s system. 
)(bsΡ is the probability of the various outcomes of the 
measurement by Eve 
}ˆ{ bE POVM (set of operators satisfying 
0ˆ >ΨΨ bE and e
b
b IE ˆˆ =∑  
⊗Tensor product 
The POVM formulation of a measurement is 
particularly convenient for optimization problems 
because not only can POVMs be derived from specific 
measurement models but, conversely, any set of 
operators }ˆ{ bE  satisfying the definition of a POVM 
can be identified with a measurement procedure [7]. 
This gives an easy algebraic characterization of all 
possible measurements.  We have the following result ( )bEss EtrbP ˆˆ)( ρ=  
Let mEE ,....,1=ε be a collection (ordered set) of 
operators such that 1) xE   are all positive semi-
definite operators, and 2) ∑ =x x IDE  , where ID 
is the identity operator. Such a collection specifies a 
Positive Operator-Valued Measure (POVM) and 
corresponds to the most general type of measurement 
that can be performed on a quantum system. 
Applying a POVM to a system whose state is 
described by a density matrix results in a probability 
distribution according to 
)(]|[Pr xETrstatexresultob ρρ ===  
There are several ways by which to quantify the 
“information” that Eve gathers about the identity of 
Alice’s preparation.  We shall consider just the most 
suitable information and distinguishability measure.  
This method, in one sense or another, describe how 
much “information” can be gained about the identity 
of a quantum state.  Also this method is truly 
information theoretic in the sense of Shannon’s 
information theory. 
Suppose Eve measures a POVM { bEˆ } on HE. If 
Alice prepared 0ρˆ , the outcomes of Eve’s 
measurement will occur with probabilities ( )bE EtrbP ˆˆ)( 00 ρ= ; if Alice prepared 1ρˆ , the outcomes 
will occur with probabilities ( )bE EtrbP ˆˆ)( 11 ρ= . 
Given this measurement on Eve’s part, the extent 
to which Alice’s preparations can be distinguished is 
exactly the extent to which the probability 
distributions )(0 bP and )(1 bP can be distinguished. 
A very simple measure of the distinguishability of 
)(0 bP and )(1 bP  is the statistical overlap between 
these distributions 
)()(),( 1010 bpbppp
b
∑=Β  
When there is no overlap between the distributions 
they can certainly be distinguished completely.  
Alternatively, the overlap is unity if and only if the 
distributions are identical and cannot be distinguished 
at all.  Such a measure of distinguishability is nice 
because of its relative simplicity in expression.  
However, this measure is not completely satisfactory 
in that it has no direct statistical inferential or 
information-theoretic meaning.  Another measure of 
how distinct p0(b) and p1(b) are the actual Shannon 
information obtainable about the identity of the 
distribution. 
)()()(),( 110010 pppHppI Η−Η−= ππ  
where 
∑−=Η
b
bqbqq )(log)()(  
is the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution 
q(b),  π0 and π1 prior probabilities for s=0 and 1 
respectively. 
)()()( 0100 bpbpbp ππ +=  is the overall prior 
probability for an outcome b.  This measure is 
particularly appropriate for gauging Eve’s 
measurement performance if her purpose is to identify 
or make an inference about a long string of quantum 
states prepared according to the distribution { π0 and 
π1 }.  Finally, we consider the situation in which Eve 
bases her performance on the success of a guess about 
the identity of one single instance of Alice’s prepared 
state.  Suppose Eve obtains outcome b in her 
measurement.  She can use this knowledge to update 
her probabilities or expectations about which state 
Alice really prepared.  This is done formally via a use 
of Bayes’ rule.  Namely, after the measurement, her 
posterior expectation for the value of s is given by 
)(
)(
)|(
bp
bp
bsp ss
π
=  
Her probability of making an error will then be the 
minimum of p(0|b) and p(1|b).  Averaging this over all 
possible outcomes gives the expected probability of 
error upon making the measurement bEˆ : 
{ }∑=Ρ
b
e bpbppp )(),(min),( 110010 ππ  
the smaller the overlap, the larger the Shannon mutual 
information, or the smaller the error probability of a 
guess, then, heuristically, the larger the “information” 
Eve has available about Alice’s preparation. We may 
also retort to the concept of fidelity.  It has several 
interesting properties despite its somewhat loose 
connection to statistical tests.  
For instance, though it is necessarily bounded 
between 0 and 1, it equals unity if and only if the two 
quantum states in its arguments are identical. 
EEEEEF 10110 ˆ)ˆ,ˆ( ΨΨ= ρρρ  
Two other important measures of distinguishability 
are: the Kolmogorov Distance and Bhattacharyya 
Coefficient [20].  
     The Kolmogorov distance between two density 
matrices is given by the relation  
))(,)((max),( 110 εερρ
ε
ppKK o
M
def
∈
=  
where the POVM ε ranges over the set of all possible 
measurements M .  The quantum mechanical relation 
is 
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2
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Two identical distributions have K=0, and two 
orthogonal distributions have K=1 
 The quantum Bhattacharyya coefficient can be 
expressed as 
)(),( 01010 ρρρρρ TrB =  
Two identical distributions have B=1, and two 
orthogonal distributions have B=0 
Any attack on the classical channel will be in terms 
of information gain on the bit values in the final sifted 
key.  In our scheme, the probability of the length (final 
key) being more than N/2 is more.  The probability of 
Eve choosing the right sifting function is 2/NNC  
based on the bases list.  
The information gain can be obtained by 
calculating the difference in the Shannon entropy with 
(H1) and without (H2) ruling out the sifting functions 
that do not reproduce the final sifted key: 
I = H1 - H2 
where  i
i
i ppH ∑−= log  
( ) ( )
22
loglog 2/
2/
22/2
NNCNCI N
N
N =−=  
But, the basis list is encrypted.  So, Eve will have 
definite information with a probability. 
Consequently, we have the net information gain 
( )
2/
2/
2N
NNCp =  
1)2/(2 +
= N
NI  
This quantized information gain is far lesser in 
comparison with the BB84 and its extensions.  This 
value also suggests the number of bits to be refreshed 
so as to maintain the secrecy of the randomizer in case 
the bit values to be encoded remain the same for every 
run of the protocol.  But this situation is very unlikely. 
  
6. Extending Randomization to 
Entanglement based QKD 
 
     As a final step, we present an entanglement based 
protocol that includes the idea of encrypting data sent 
over public channel. The protocol extends the scheme 
proposed by Artur Ekert [3]. 
      The key distribution is performed via a quantum 
channel which consists of a source that emits pairs of 
spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state  
( )↑↓−↓↑=Ψ
2
1  
The Particles fly apart along the z-axis towards the 
two legitimate users of the channel, Alice and Bob, 
who, after the particles have separated, perform 
measurement and register spin components along one 
of three directions, given by unit vectors  ia
 and jb

  
(i; j = 1; 2; 3), respectively for Alice and Bob. For 
simplicity both ia
 and jb

   vectors lie in the x-y 
plane, perpendicular to the trajectory of the particles, 
and are characterized by azimuthal angles:  
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Superscripts “a" and “b" refer to Alice's and 
Bob's analyzers respectively and the angle is measured 
from the vertical x-axis. The users choose the 
orientation of the analyzers randomly and 
independently for each pair of the incoming particles. 
The list of orientations chosen forms the bases list of 
Alice (Ba) and the observed bit values (Ka), the raw 
key. Similar is the case with Bob (Bb and Kb). But raw 
key observed on either side of the channel may be of 
different versions.   
    If the choice of bases is the same for a particular 
pair, quantum mechanics predicts total anticorrelation 
of the results obtained by Alice 
and Bob:  ( ) ( ) 1,, 2312 −== baEbaE   
where the quantity 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )jijijijiji baPbaPbaPbaPbaE  ,,,,, +−−+−−++ −−+=
is the correlation coefficient of the measurements 
performed by Alice along ia

and by Bob along jb

. 
Here ( )ji baP  ,±± denotes the probability that result  
1±  has been obtained along ia
 and 1±  along jb

 . 
One can define quantity S composed of the correlation 
coefficients for which Alice and Bob used different 
bases for measurement ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )33133111 ,,,, baEbaEbaEbaES  ++−=  
Quantum mechanics requires 22−=S . 
      Both can now retort to an error correction 
procedure to be applied on the raw keys observed, to 
obtain an exact error corrected key (K).  After the 
transmission has taken place, Alice and Bob can 
announce in public the orientations of the analyzers 
they have chosen for each particular measurement 
XORed with K. Note that the public announcement of 
the bases lists has been encrypted. The encrypted 
bases list is decrypted by performing XOR with K on 
each side. They divide the measurements into two 
separate groups: a first group for which they used 
different bases, and a second group for which they 
used the same bases. They discard all measurements in 
which either or both of them failed to register a 
particle at all. Further, any eavesdropping during 
quantum transmission can be detected by computing 
the correlation coefficient S on unequal bases. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
At the very outset, the protocol suggested by us is 
essentially a reordering of the operations in the 
standard BB84, with the additional security of 
encrypted public transmission about which Eve will 
attain practically lesser information.  The EPP 
protocols whose security considerations are well 
analyzed can be reduced to the present form of our 
protocol. The extension to entanglement based scheme 
results in a more secure protocol whose practical 
applicability needs to be analyzed.  An improvement 
of the protocol can be developed with consideration to 
details concerning apparatus used for transmitting 
quantum information, for better generalization.  The 
future enhancements involve statistical analysis of the 
performance of the protocol using QuCrypt. 
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